You will be able to say what studies of active funds show and where a retail investor may still have an edge.
Marcus is an operations manager who invests with a spreadsheet and fits his research into his evenings. When he compared his results with a managed fund in lesson 12.6, Benchmark your results against a managed fund, like for like, it raised a harder question. If professional fund managers, with research teams and data he does not have, mostly fail to beat their benchmarks, what chance does someone like him have.
The answer has two parts. On average, very little. In a few specific places, he has more chance than a fund manager, for reasons that have nothing to do with being cleverer.
Funds that do badly are often closed or merged into better ones, and when that happens their records disappear. A table of funds that exist today shows only the survivors, so its average looks better than the average fund investors actually owned. This distortion is called survivorship bias. Lesson 1.7, Read a fund's performance table without being misled, showed it with ten made-up funds.
It reaches well beyond fund tables. Stories about successful stock pickers are survivors too: you hear about the friend whose picks doubled, and not about the three who went back to index funds after a bad run. Studies and backtests (tests of a strategy on past data) built from today's list of companies leave out the ones that went bankrupt or were delisted, as lesson 10.6, Data mining, overfitting and transaction costs, warned.
Before you weigh any claim about how well active investing works, first ask whether it counts the ones that did not make it: the funds that closed or merged, and the companies that went bankrupt or were delisted. If it leaves them out, its results look better than what investors actually got.
The most widely used evidence on active funds is SPIVA (S&P Indices Versus Active), published by S&P Dow Jones Indices. Each scorecard compares the actively managed funds in a market with the benchmark for their category, over periods from one year up to fifteen or twenty years. SPIVA counts funds that closed or merged during each period, so survivorship does not flatter the results. It also measures each fund against the index for its own category, so a small-company fund is judged against a small-company index rather than a large-company one.
In the SPIVA scorecards, across most categories and most long periods, most active funds trailed their benchmarks, and the longer the period, the more consistent that finding has tended to be. The exact share varies by region, category and edition, so no SPIVA numbers are quoted here. Read the latest scorecard yourself rather than relying on a figure from an old article. When you do, compare funds within their own category and look across to the longest period. Lesson 6.2, What the SPIVA reports measure and show, in the course Unit trusts, robo-advisors and managed money compared, explains how to read one.
S&P Dow Jones Indices also publishes persistence scorecards, which check whether funds that did well in one period stayed near the top in the next. If you plan to choose a manager, or yourself, based on past results, these are the most relevant evidence you can read.
The arithmetic underneath applies to individual stock pickers as much as to funds. Before costs, active investors as a group hold the market, so on average they earn its return. After costs, they must trail it on average. Lesson 6.1 of the same course, Why active funds as a group trail the market after costs, works through this.
Someone running their own money does have a few structural edges. They come from size and freedom rather than skill.
The first is small companies. Take Larkspur, the invented company from lesson 5.4, Index construction and what inclusion does to a stock. It has a free float (the shares available to trade on the market) of 135 million shares at S$1.60, worth about S$216 million (135 million x S$1.60). It trades about 0.6 million shares a day, roughly S$960,000 (0.6 million x S$1.60).
Now picture a fund of S$1 billion (an example figure) that wants Larkspur at 2% of its portfolio. That means buying S$20 million of shares. At S$1.60 that is 12.5 million shares, and at 0.6 million a day it equals about 21 days of the stock's entire trading. A large fund cannot buy a thinly traded company like this in meaningful size without pushing the price up on the way in, and getting out in a hurry would be worse. Marcus can buy S$8,000 of Larkspur in an afternoon.
The second is time. Fund managers are judged quarterly and lose clients after a bad year, so holding a cheap, unloved stock for three years while it recovers is a career risk for them. You have no clients, and you can wait as long as your thesis (your reasons for owning the stock) holds.
The third is freedom from a benchmark. A professional who strays far from the index and turns out to be wrong may lose their job, so many hold close to it. You can hold a concentrated, unusual portfolio if your own rules allow it.
Professionals get information faster, meet management, pay lower trading costs and research full-time, while you fit research into your evenings. These advantages count most in large companies covered by dozens of analysts. In those companies you have the least chance of knowing something the price does not already reflect.
Your own behaviour can also cancel an edge. Trading too often or selling in a panic turns the time advantage into a weakness.
Marcus realises, uncomfortably, that his chip designer holding, a widely followed US company, sits squarely in the group where retail investors have no edge, because it is large and heavily researched.
Read the latest SPIVA scorecard for one region and write one sentence on what it shows for the category closest to your satellite stocks. Then write one sentence on where, if anywhere, your satellite uses an edge a fund manager lacks.
Junxiong-WFG Organisation is an authorised representative of AIA Financial Advisers Private Limited (Reg. No. 201715016G).