Management incentives, ownership and related-party deals

Judge whether management is paid to grow value per share or only to make the company bigger.

Open the most recent annual report of the company you are studying and find the corporate governance report. Inside it is the remuneration section. It sets out what directors and the most senior executives were paid, often in bands rather than exact sums, and it describes the performance measures used to decide their bonuses and share awards. If your company is listed in the US, use the proxy statement. The detail is usually under the heading compensation discussion and analysis.

Pay is the place to begin because people do what they are paid to do. To judge whether management is working for minority shareholders, you need three answers. What is management rewarded for? How much of the company does it own? Does a controlling shareholder do any side business with the company?

Sorting what the board pays for

Newspapers usually quote the pay total. As an analyst, you look past that total. It tells you what management earned last year. The performance measures tell you what conduct the board plans to reward from now on. Take the measures one at a time and put each one into one of two groups.

The first group is size-based measures, such as revenue, EBITDA, assets under management and store count. Management can push any of these up by spending shareholders' money. Buying another company raises revenue straight away, whatever price is paid. Issuing new shares to fund growth raises EBITDA, even though each existing share now owns a smaller part of the company. Heavy borrowing raises both revenue and EBITDA, and shareholders carry the risk.

The second group is value-per-share measures, such as earnings per share, free cash flow per share and return on invested capital. These are harder to game, because each of them drops when management overpays for growth. Total shareholder return measured against a peer group also goes in this group, since it links pay to what holders actually received.

The time frame matters as much as the measure. For each measure, check whether performance is judged over a single year or over three years or more. Find out how long share awards take to vest and whether executives have to keep holding the shares after they vest. Also check whether the board sets new targets every year. A plan that uses a value measure judged over three years or more rewards the conduct shareholders want.

With these details you can place the plan on a range. At the good end is a value measure, a long vesting period and a rule that executives keep their shares after vesting. At the poor end are large bonuses paid on one-year revenue or EBITDA targets. The board resets those targets every year and can lower the bar after a weak year.

Larkspur's pay plan and the coatings purchase

Marcus (an invented learner) is following Larkspur, a made-up company with invented figures, through the course. The first time he reads its remuneration section, he finds a plan in two parts. The first part is a yearly cash bonus paid on revenue growth and on EBITDA measured against budget. The second is a performance share plan that vests after three years if revenue grows at a set compound rate. Neither part mentions profit per share, cash flow or return on capital.

Marcus compares this with the coatings business Larkspur bought four years ago. The purchase brought in about S$60 million of revenue overnight and S$30 million of goodwill, and Lesson 6.4 showed that the coatings segment earns almost nothing. The chairman's letter that year described the deal as a step towards diversification. The CEO, who is the founder's son, received his revenue-linked bonus in full that year. Marcus puts Larkspur's plan near the poor end of the range.

Be careful about how much a finding like this proves. A weak pay plan does not show that a deal was made to earn a bonus. It shows only that nothing in the plan would have prevented such a deal.

Management's shareholdings and insider trades

Ownership is the second half of incentives. A CEO whose shares are worth several times their salary feels a falling share price the same way you do. A CEO who owns almost no shares can leave the problem to others. The annual report's shareholding statistics list substantial shareholders and directors' interests. Put each executive's holding next to their pay. Keep in mind that a controlling family may care about things other than the share price.

Larkspur's founding family owns 55%, and the CEO holds a further 2% directly. Marcus notes that this ties management closely to the share price.

Next, look at insider dealings. On SGX, directors and substantial shareholders must disclose when they buy or sell shares, and the notices are published on SGXNet. In the US, insiders report their trades to the SEC on a Form 4, which you can search on EDGAR. Insider selling on its own counts for little, because executives sell to pay tax, to diversify or to cover school fees. An insider buying in the open market with their own money tells you more, because there is usually only one reason to do that. When several insiders buy in the same month, record it in your log.

Dealings between the company and its controller

Many SGX companies have a controller, such as a founding family, a parent company or a government-linked holder. Control can be a strength, because the company can plan for the long term without pressure to meet quarterly targets. The risk is that the controller does business with the company on terms that favour the controller. SGX listing rules call these dealings interested person transactions. The rules set when they have to be announced, when independent shareholders must approve them, and how the annual report must disclose them. Many companies obtain a general mandate, which is shareholder approval given in advance for routine transactions of this kind. They then list the totals each year.

Ask three questions of every related-party deal: whether it is priced at market rates, whether the amount is growing faster than the business, and whether new dealings keep appearing. One small lease is normal in a family-controlled company. Two patterns have hurt minority holders: a related-party list that gets longer every year, and a large asset bought from the controller at a price the controller set.

Marcus finds Larkspur's related-party lease on page 170 of the annual report. A company owned by the founding family rents Larkspur a warehouse in Malaysia for about S$1.2 million a year. That is small compared with Larkspur's revenue of S$400 million.

Finish the analysis with a short summary in your log. Marcus writes four points. Management owns many shares, which helps. Pay is linked to revenue and EBITDA, which rewards size. There is one small related-party lease. Acquisitions are the thing to watch.

Now write down the performance measures in your chosen company's pay plan, and mark whether each one rewards value per share or just size.

List the performance measures in your chosen company's pay plan and note whether each one rewards value per share.

Course

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